

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge or Magistrate Judge	BLANCHE M. MANNING	Sitting Judge if Other than Assigned Judge	
CASE NUMBER	11 C 8020	DATE	November 21, 2011
CASE TITLE	Javier Montanez (#2010-0204119) vs. City of Chicago, et al.		

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT:

The plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* [#3] is granted. The court authorizes and orders Cook County Jail officials to deduct \$45.00 from the plaintiff's account, and to continue making monthly deductions in accordance with this order. The clerk shall send a copy of this order to the Supervisor of Inmate Trust Fund Accounts, Cook County Dept. of Corrections Administrative Office, Division V, 2700 S. California, Chicago, Illinois 60608. On the court's own motion, the City of Chicago is dismissed as a defendant on preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The clerk is directed to issue summonses for service on defendants Anderson, Smulski, and Davy. The clerk is further directed to send the plaintiff a Magistrate Judge Consent Form and Instructions for Submitting Documents along with a copy of this order. The plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel [#4] is denied.

■ [For further details see text below.]

Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT

The plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the Cook County Department of Corrections, has brought this *pro se* civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff claims that the defendants, Chicago police officers, violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights by using unjustified force against him when they arrested him.

The plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is granted. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee of \$45.00. The supervisor of inmate trust accounts at the Cook County Jail is authorized and ordered to collect, when funds exist, the partial filing fee from the plaintiff's trust fund account and pay it directly to the Clerk of Court. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the trust fund officer at the plaintiff's place of confinement is directed to collect monthly payments from the plaintiff's trust fund account in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month's income credited to the account. Monthly payments collected from the plaintiff's trust fund account shall be forwarded to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds \$10 until the full \$350 filing fee is paid. All payments shall be sent to the Clerk, United States District Court, 219 S. Dearborn St., Chicago, Illinois 60604, attn: Cashier's Desk, 20th
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STATEMENT (continued)

Floor, and shall clearly identify the plaintiff's name and the case number assigned to this action. The Cook County inmate trust account office shall notify transferee authorities of any outstanding balance in the event the plaintiff is transferred from the jail to another correctional facility.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court is required to conduct a prompt threshold review of the complaint. Here, accepting the plaintiff's allegations as true, the court finds that the plaintiff has articulated a colorable cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the police may use only "reasonable" force when effecting an arrest. *See, e.g., Padula v. Leimbach*, 656 F.3d 595, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2011). While a more fully developed record may belie the plaintiff's allegations, defendants Anderson, Smulski, and Davy must respond to the complaint.

However, the complaint is dismissed on initial review as to the City of Chicago. The doctrine of *respondeat superior* (blanket municipal liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *See, e.g., Monell v. New York Dept. of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); *Thompson v. Boggs*, 33 F.3d 847, 859 n.11 (7th Cir. 1994) ("*Monell* expressly holds that there is no cause of action for *respondeat superior* liability against a municipal corporation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983"). "[A] local government may not be sued under §1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents." *Monell*, 436 U.S. at 694.

A governmental entity is responsible under Section 1983 only when the execution of a governmental policy or custom inflicts the injury. *Valentino v. Village of South Chicago Heights*, 575 F.3d 664, 674-675 (7th Cir. 2009), *citing Monell*, 436 U.S. at 694. A municipality cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation in the absence of a custom, policy or practice that effectively caused or condoned the alleged constitutional violations. *See, e.g., Wragg v. Village of Thornton*, 604 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 2010); *Phelan v. Cook County*, 463 F.3d 773, 789 (7th Cir. 2006); *Monell*, 436 U.S. at 694. The policy or custom must be the "moving force" behind the alleged constitutional deprivation. *Gable v. City of Chicago*, 296 F.3d 531, 537 (7th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff must show a "direct causal link between the municipal policy and the constitutional deprivation." *Arlotta v. Bradley Center*, 349 F.3d 517, 522 (7th Cir. 2003). Here, the plaintiff suggests no official custom or policy authorizing police officers to use excessive force; to the contrary, he notes that his complaint is currently being investigated by the Office of Professional Standards. Accordingly, the City itself is not a proper defendant in this action.

The clerk shall issue summonses forthwith for service on defendants Anderson, Smulski, and Davy. The United States Marshals Service is appointed to serve the defendants. Any service forms necessary for the plaintiff to complete will be sent by the Marshal as appropriate to serve the defendants with process. The U.S. Marshal is directed to make all reasonable efforts to serve the defendants. With respect to former police officers who no longer can be found at the work address provided by the plaintiff, the Chicago Police Department shall furnish the Marshal with the defendant's last-known address. The information shall be used only for purposes of effectuating service [or for proof of service, should a dispute arise] and any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the
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STATEMENT (continued)

Marshal. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file, nor disclosed by the Marshal. The Marshal is authorized to mail a request for waiver of service to the defendants in the manner prescribed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2) before attempting personal service.

The plaintiff is instructed to file all future papers concerning this action with the Clerk of Court in care of the Prisoner Correspondent. The plaintiff must provide the court with the original plus a complete judge's copy, including any exhibits, of every document filed. In addition, the plaintiff must send an exact copy of any court filing to the defendants [or to defense counsel, once an attorney has entered an appearance on behalf of the defendants]. Every document filed with the court must include a certificate of service stating to whom exact copies were mailed and the date of mailing. Any paper that is sent directly to the judge or that otherwise fails to comply with these instructions may be disregarded by the court or returned to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel is denied. There is no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in federal civil cases. *Romanelli v. Suliene*, 615 F.3d 847, 851 (2010); *see also Johnson v. Doughty*, 433 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2006). Nevertheless, the district court has discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) to request counsel for an indigent litigant. *Pruitt v. Mote*, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007), *citing Johnson*, 433 F.3d at 1006. When a *pro se* litigant submits a request for appointment of counsel, the court must first consider whether the indigent plaintiff has made reasonable attempts to secure counsel on his own, or conversely, if he has been precluded from doing so. *Pruitt*, 503 F.3d at 654. Next, the court must evaluate the complexity of the case and whether the plaintiff appears competent to litigate it on his own. *Id.* at 654-55. Another consideration is whether the assistance of counsel would provide a substantial benefit to the court or the parties, potentially affecting the outcome of the case. *Id.* at 654; *Gil v. Reed*, 381 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir. 2004); *see also* Local Rule 83.36(c) (N.D. Ill.) (listing the factors to be taken into account in determining whether to appoint counsel).

After considering the above factors, the court concludes that appointment of counsel is not warranted in this case. Although the complaint sets forth cognizable claims, the plaintiff has alleged no physical or mental disability that might preclude him from adequately investigating the facts giving rise to his complaint. Neither the legal issues raised in the complaint nor the evidence that might support the plaintiff's claims are so complex or intricate that a trained attorney is necessary. The plaintiff, whose initial submissions are coherent and articulate, appears more than capable of presenting his case, notwithstanding the limitations posed by his incarceration and lack of legal expertise. It should additionally be noted that the court grants *pro se* litigants wide latitude in the handling of their lawsuits. Therefore, the plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel is denied at this time. Should the case proceed to a point that assistance of counsel is appropriate, the court may revisit this request.

As a final concern, the plaintiff is advised to conduct discovery as soon as possible in order to identify the "John Doe" officers. There is a two-year statute of limitations for civil rights actions; in this circuit, a plaintiff cannot invoke the relation back principles of Rule 15(c) to replace John Doe defendants with named defendants after the statute of limitations has expired. *See Worthington v. Wilson*, 8 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (7th Cir. 1993); *see also Wood v. Worachek*, 618 F.2d 1225, 1230 (7th Cir. 1980).